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RIGHTS OF PERSONS COMPELLED TO APPEAR IN 
FEDERAL AGENCY INVESTIGATIONAL HEARINGS 
David C. Murchison* 
BY statutes designed to protect the public interest, many federal administrative agencies-such as the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, and the Civil Aeronautics Board-are granted authority to 
conduct investigations dealing with substantive matters commit-
ted to their respective jurisdictions.1 In an increasing number of 
instances, these agencies are empowered to utilize compulsory 
process; persons may be ordered to appear and give testimony or 
to produce documents in so-called investigational hearings, subject 
to criminal sanctions for noncompliance.2 The use of investiga-
tional hearings by these agencies as an ancillary law enforcement 
tool would appear to be more widespread than at any previous 
time in the history of the "fourth branch of government." 
In recent decades, much has been written by the press, and a 
great deal has been heard from the courts about agency personnel 
security risks who should not be dismissed from employment with-
out being accorded procedural rights, aliens who should not be de-
• Member of the District of Columbia Bar.-Ed. This article is adapted from the 
remarks of the author before the Administrative Law Committee of the Federal Bar 
Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on September 24, 1963. Appreciation is ex• 
pressed for the assistance of Robert W. Steele of the Bar of the District of Columbia. 
1 Interstate Commerce Commission, 24 Stat. 383 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 12 
(1958); 49 Stat. 548, 550 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 305(d) (1958); 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 
U.S.C. § 901 (1958). The Water Carrier Act changed the short title to "part III of the 
Interstate Commerce Act." 54 Stat. 919 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1958); 54 Stat. 946 (1940), 
49 U.S.C. § 916 (1958); 56 Stat. 746 (1942), 49 U.S.C. § 1017 (1958). Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 48 Stat. 1073, 1094 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 208, 403 (1958). Securities 8e 
Exchange Commission, 48 Stat. 85, 86 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 77v (1958); 48 Stat. 899 
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1958); 49 Stat. 831 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79r (1958); 53 Stat. 1174 
(1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu (1958); 54 Stat. 842 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958); 54 Stat. 
853 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1958); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). Federal Trade Com-
mission, 38 Stat. 722, 723 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1958). Civil Aeronautics Board, 72 
Stat. 792 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1484(a)-(d)(i) (1958). Some sixty federal acts, half of them 
passed since 1933, have given investigative subpoena powers to executive and administra-
tive officers. For a comprehensive study of these specific enactments, see Rogge, Inquisitions 
by Officials, 47 MINN. L. R.Ev. 939 (1963). 
2 Illustrative criminal provisions are contained in the statutes of the following agen-
cies: Federal Power Commission, 49 Stat. 856 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825£ (1958); Federal 
Trade Commission, 38 Stat. 722, 723 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1958); Internal Revenue 
Service, INT. R.Ev. CODE oF 1954, §§ 7604, 7210; Labor Department, 39 Stat. 748 (1916), 
5 U.S.C. § 780 (1958); 49 Stat. 2038 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 39 (1958); 52 Stat. 1065, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 209 (1958); 72 Stat. 835, 33 U.S.C. § 94l(b) (1958); 73 Stat. 539, 29 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. 
IV, 1963); 76 Stat. 37, 29 U.S.C. § 308 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
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ported without being given their rights, and alleged Communists 
who should not be deprived of their rights in agency actions.8 But 
it is not an over-generalization to say that surprisingly little atten-
tion has been focused on the rights of individuals in the business 
community who are compelled to submit to interrogation on mat-
ters which may be the subject of subsequent agency trial proceed-
ings. The public at large seems generally unaware of the colli-
sion which occurs between the alleged rights of these persons and 
the stated procedures of administrative agencies whose activities 
are mainly concerned with regulation of industry and commerce. 
The basic problem is simply stated: What rights does the pri-
vate businessman have when an agency decides to investigate his 
conduct and invokes compulsory process, enforceable by criminal 
penalties, to compel him to appear and give sworn testimony on 
a record? 
In 1936, in Jones v. SEC,4 the Supreme Court rather strongly 
circumscribed the investigative process in these terms: 
"A general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial compulsory inves-
tigation, conducted by a commission without any allegations, 
upon no fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law, 
or of evidence, and no restrictions except its own will, or 
caprice, is unknown to our constitution and laws; and such 
an inquisition would be destructive to the rights of the citi-
zen, and an intolerable tyranny."5 
These words have a traditional ring. Few lawyers would ques-
tion their accuracy. Certainly they correctly sum up the views of 
Anglo-Saxon lawmakers who dissolved the courts of Star Chamber 
in 1640. 
Yet commentators in the administrative law field have gener-
ally concurred in the view that the judicial attitude expressed in 
Jones v. SEC has become "utterly exhausted."6 Indeed, text writers 
during the 1930's and early 1940's often appeared to take the posi-
tion that procedural improprieties in investigatory hearings were 
8 See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 
(1956); United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 
(1955); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath, 
339 U .s. 33 (1950). 
4 298 U.S. 1 (1936). 
IS The language quoted is from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Sawyer in In re 
Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 Fed. 241, 263 (N.D. Cal. 1887). 
6 See 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.01, at 162 (1951); FoRKOSCH, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAw § 139, at 226-27 (1956); Newman, Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights 
of Subpoenaed Witnesses, 60 MICH. L. REv. 169 (1961). 
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simply of no consequence. For instance, one commentator stated:· 
"Since the results of an investigation are not conclusive against a 
witness, the due process clause would seem to impose no restraints 
on administrative inquiries.''7 Of course, this view ignores the 
realities of many types of investigational hearings now conducted. 
While some administrative agencies are merely authorized to 
conduct general fact-finding or economic investigations which can-
not lead to an adverse final order against persons interrogated, many 
agencies conducting investigatory hearings are authorized and re-
quired to institute adjudicatory or trial proceedings to determine 
and halt violations of the laws which they administer.8 In instances 
where agencies compel the attendance of potential respondents or 
officials of potential respondent corporations for the purpose of 
investigating suspected violations of law, it is superficial at best to 
conclude that the citizen cannot be harmed or that substantial 
rights are not involved. In practice, agency investigators often con-
duct these hearings with all the crusading spirit of prosecutors. 
The record made during investigational hearings may constitute 
the primary evidence relied upon at trial. In many instances, in-
vestigational hearings are little more than one part of a continued 
procedural sequence looking toward the adjudicative stage and the 
ultimate entry of a final order against the person investigated or 
some business entity with which he is affiliated.9 
While the courts have not had an opportunity to develop a 
definitive body of decisional law fully delineating constitutional 
safeguards, there are a number of statutory provisions, sometimes 
overlooked, which directly protect the person compelled to appear 
in investigational hearings. The principal source of these statutory 
rights is the Administrative Procedure Act.10 Drafted in response 
7 Note, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1214, 1216 (1941). 
8 The Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
National Labor Relations Board are typical of such agencies. 
9 In some agencies, investigations are conducted as one part of a comprehensive pro• 
cedure under which a single attorney is in charge of a case at all phases. For instance, 
the Federal Trade Commission's reorganization plan, announced on June 25, 1961, re• 
veals the discontinuance of the Commission's separate investigatory unit and the com-
bination of investigatory and prosecuting functions in a single office. The attorney-in-
charge is responsible for pre-complaint investigation, prosecution, and post-adjudication 
investigations and proceedings directed at enforcement of cease-and-desist orders. The 
Commission's announcement of June 25, 1961 stated: "A major innovation of the new 
organization will be the centering of responsibility on individual attorneys assigned to the 
Restraint of Trade and Deceptive Practice Bureaus for the forward progress of each 
case from the time it is entered for investigation until the case is completed, including 
checks on compliance with any cease and desist order that might be issued against the 
respondent." U.S. Federal Trade Commission-Rules, Policy, Organization, and Acts, 
June 25, 1961. 
10 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-12 (1958). 
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to widespread criticism of increasing agency powers in the 1930's 
and early 1940's,11 the act set up procedural safeguards in three 
types of agency proceedings: (1) rule-making or quasi-legislative 
proceedings, (2) trial or quasi-adjudicative proceedings, and (3) 
investigatory proceedings. Some of the provisions of the act, by 
their terms, govern only adjudicative or rule-making proceedings. 
Other provisions, such as sections I, 3, 6, 9, and 12, have general 
application and apply to all types of proceedings, including in-
vestigations.12 
Of course, equally important sources of statutory guarantees 
may be found in the basic statutes which authorize particular 
agencies to carry on investigative hearings. It is axiomatic that an 
agency cannot act in excess of the authority which it has been 
granted by Congress. Moreover, where the statute is silent on 
matters of traditional rights, the Supreme Court teaches us that, 
when an agency purports to limit or deny these rights, it may ex-
ceed its statutory authority. 
This latter principle was enunciated in the landmark decision 
of Greene v. McElroy,13 where the Supreme Court ruled that, in 
the absence of express authorization, an agency could not revoke 
the security clearance of an employee of a defense contractor in 
an administrative action where he was denied the traditional safe-
guards of confrontation and cross-examination.14 The Court held 
11 See Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 
S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1941). In the House Judiciary Committee Report, 
the Administrative Procedure Act was labeled as "an outline of minimum essential 
rights and procedures." S. Doc. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 250 (1946). The Senate Judiciary 
Committee Report makes substantially the same comment. Id. at 205. The Supreme 
Court recognized this legislative history in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 
632, 644 (1950), where it commented: "The Administrative Procedure Act was framed 
against a background of rapid expansion of the administrative process as a check upon 
administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contem-
plated in legislation creating their offices." 
12 The drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act in the House Judiciary Com-
mittee prepared an extensive chart graphically demonstrating the intended application 
of the various sections of the act. See S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 266-67 (1946). 
13 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
14 The Supreme Court emphasized that drastic procedures will not be sanctioned 
unless they are expressly authorized. Thus, the argument that Congress and the President 
had impliedly authorized an inquisitorial procedure by inaction and acquiescence was 
flaty rejected. The Court said: "[I]t must be made clear that the President 
or Congress, within their respective constitutional powers, specifically has decided that 
the imposed procedures are necessary and warranted and has authorized their use. 
Cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178; Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344. Such decisions 
cannot be assumed by acquiescence or non-action. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116; Peters v. 
Hobby, 349 U.S. 331; Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301·02. They must be made explicitly 
not only to assure that individuals are not deprived of cherished rights under procedures 
not actually authorized, see Peters v. Hobby, supra, but also because explicit action, 
especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires careful and purposeful considera-
tion by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws." Id. at 507. 
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that, where there is no statute or the statute is silent, "traditional 
safeguards" such as confrontation and cross-examination are "as-
sumed" to be included in the operative provisions of the law.15 
This aspect of the Greene decision was not limited to adjudicatory 
proceedings.10 
Let us consider some of the more significant rights, statutory 
or otherwise, which may be asserted by a person compelled to sub-
mit to interrogation in an administrative investigational hearing. 
The Rights of Cross-Examination, Confrontation, and Apprisal 
No express provision of the Administrative Procedure Act deals 
with the rights of cross-examination, confrontation, and apprisal 
in investigatory hearings. Section 7 of the act, which deals with 
cross-examination and confrontation, is limited to adjudicatory 
and rule-making proceedings. The contention that this section and 
the Constitution affirmatively guarantee such rights in investiga-
tional hearings was rejected in the Supreme Court's decision in 
Hannah v. Larche,11 and in the decision of Judge Leon Yankwich 
in FCC v. Schreiber.18 
The Hannah case arose under the Civil Rights Act,19 which 
created a temporary Civil Rights Commission and granted it the 
limited power to conduct fact-finding inquiries to determine 
whether state governments were depriving Negroes of their right 
to vote. The Commission had received sixty-seven secret com-
plaints from Negro informants in Louisiana, alleging that they 
had been denied the right to vote. The Commission scheduled 
hearings to be held in Shreveport, Louisiana, and thereafter served 
subpoenas upon various voting registrars commanding them to 
appear at the hearings. The Commission notified the persons sub-
poenaed that, under its rules, persons compelled to appear would 
not be told the identity of informants and would not be permitted 
to cross-examine such accuser informants. Suits for injunction were 
then filed by the registrars in the United States district court on 
the sole ground that the deprivation of the rights of confrontation 
15 The Court said: ''Where administrative action has raised serious constitutional 
problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford those 
affected by the action the traditional safeguards of due process." Id. at 507-08. 
10 The Court stressed the fact that it had in the past been zealous to protect these 
rights from erosion "not only in criminal cases •.. but also in all types of cases where 
administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny." Id. at 497. 
17 868 U.S. 420 (1960). 
18 201 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Cal. 1962), appeal pending in the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. 
10 71 Stat. 684 (1957), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-75e (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1968). 
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and cross-examination was not authorized by the Civil Rights 
Act, and that if the deprivation was authorized the act was un-
constitutional. The district court ruled that Congress had not 
authorized the Commission, within the meaning of Greene v. 
McElroy, to adopt rules which denied these rights; it therefore 
enjoined the holding of the hearings.20 
On review, the United States Supreme Court reversed, decid-
ing three points: (1) Co~gress had expressly authorized the Civil 
Rights Commission to promulgate rules wherein confrontation, 
apprisal, and cross-examination were not accorded to subpoenaed 
persons.21 (2) Under the Constitution, it was not a denial of due 
process for Congress to extinguish the rights of confrontation, ap-
prisal, and cross-examination in a purely investigatory hearing 
conducted by an agency that had no power to adjudicate.22 (3) 
Section 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which by its terms 
is limited to adjudicatory and rule-making procedures, did not 
grant the right to confront or cross-examine third-party accuser 
witnesses in a purely investigatory hearing.28 
The Hannah decision concerned only the rights of witnesses in 
general fact-finding hearings conducted by an agency having no 
adjudicative functions. The Court placed great emphasis on the 
fact that the Civil Rights Commission "does not and cannot take 
any affirmative action which will affect an individual's legal 
rights."24 Manifestly, the decision does not hold that all agencies 
have the right to deprive subpoenaed witnesses of the rights of 
confrontation, cross-examination and apprisal in investigatory 
hearings. At the threshold, the key question, as recognized by the 
Court in Greene and reaffirmed in Hannah, is whether Congress 
or the President has authorized the agency to abrogate these rights. 
In Hannah the district court had ruled that the doctrine of 
Greene applied to investigations as well as adjudications, and that 
an agency might not deprive plaintiffs of their rights of confronta-
tion and cross-examination in the absence of express authorization 
20 Larche v. Hannah, 176 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. La. 1959); Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. 
Supp. 816, 824-25 (W.D. La. 1959), where the court said: "In accordance with the teachings 
of Greene, we decide only that in a bearing such as the one envisaged here, the Com-
mission bad no right to deny the accused Registrars the traditional rights of confronta-
tion and cross-examination in the absence of explicit congressional authorization to do 
so." 
21 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 439 (1960). 
22 Id. at 440. In FCC v. Schreiber, 201 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Cal. 1962), Judge Yankwich 
relied upon the authority of Hannah in ruling that a witness subpoenaed to testify in a 
general fact-finding investigation of the FCC bad no right to cross-examine third persons. 
28 Hannah v. Larche, supra note 21, at 452. 
24 Id. at 443. 
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for such action.25 The Supreme Court did not disagree with this 
basic approach to the issue. Significantly, it expressly followed the 
district court approach and took pains to determine the threshold 
question of whether Congress had authorized the rules adopted 
by the Civil Rights Commission. The Court said: 
"The considerations which prompted us in Greene to analyze 
the question of authorization before reaching the constitu-
tional issues presented are no less pertinent in this case. Ob-
viously, if the Civil Rights Commission was not authorized to 
adopt the procedures complained of by the respondents, the 
case could be disposed of without a premature determination 
of serious constitutional questions."26 
The Court then undertook an extensive analysis of the legisla-
tive history of the Civil Rights Act. Disagreeing with the district 
court, it concluded that Congress had expressly authorized the 
Civil Rights Commission to carry on investigatory hearings with-
out according the rights of confrontation or cross-examination.21 
Having determined that the procedures adopted by the Civil 
Rights Commission had been expressly authorized, the Court 
turned to the separate constitutional question of whether due proc-
ess required that the rights of cross-examination, confrontation, 
and apprisal be accorded in purely investigatory proceedings. In 
reaching a negative conclusion on this issue, the Court emphasized 
that the Commission was not empowered to "take any affirmative 
action which will affect an individual's legal rights."28 One may 
ponder whether the constitutionality of a congressional enactment 
would be upheld which affirmatively authorized the denial of these 
rights by an agency empowered to prosecute and adjudicate as well 
as investigate. 
Since Hannah did not overrule Greene, but merely found the 
existence of an authorization not present in Greene, the vitality of 
25 Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816, 825 (W.D. La. 1959). 
26 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 430 (1960). 
21 The Supreme Court in Hannah distinguished the legislative authority for the 
procedures involved in the Greene case in the following words: "The facts of this case 
present a sharp contrast to those before the Court in Greene. Here, we have substantially 
more than the mere acquiescence upon which the Government relied in Greene. There 
was a conscious, intentional selection by Congress of one bill, providing for none of the 
procedures demanded by respondents, over another bill, which provided for all of those 
procedures, We have no doubt that Congress' consideration and rejection of the pro-
cedures here at issue constituted an authorization to the Commission to conduct its 
hearings according to the Rules of Procedure it has adopted, and to deny the witnesses 
the rights of apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examination." Id. at 439. 
28 Id. at 443. 
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the Greene doctrine would appear undiminished.20 That doctrine 
explicitly holds that an agency may not curtail or extinguish 
traditional rights (such as cross-examination and confrontation) 
unless Congress authorizes it to do so--even though no constitu-
tional inhibition has been violated by the agency. Frank C. New-
man has correctly commented that Hannah "governs only those 
cases where the congressional intent to deny confrontation and 
cross-examination seems clear."30 
The legal test governing the availability of cross-examination 
and confrontation thus would appear to be this: If Congress does 
not authorize the abrogation of these rights, the court will presume 
they are available, without reaching the further question of 
whether the abrogation has been shown to violate the due process 
clause. If Congress expressly authorizes the denial of these rights, 
then the question is whether the abrogation in investigational 
hearings constitutes a violation of the Constitution not found to be 
present in Hannah. The perplexing fact today is that the investi-
gational procedures of many agencies have continued to ignore this 
test. 
The Right To Be Represented by Counsel 
While the Administrative Procedure Act is silent as to such 
rights as cross-examination in investigational hearings, it is specific 
in guaranteeing the right of legal representation. Section 6(a) ex-
pressly provides: "Any person compelled to appear in person be-
fore any agency or representative thereof shall be accorded the 
right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel .... " 
The legislative history of section 6(a) makes it clear that the 
drafters of the act intended it to apply in investigatory hearings, 
whether public or private, as well as in adjudicatory matters. Thus, 
the report of the House Judiciary Committee expressly stated: 
"The section is a statement of statutory and mandatory right of 
interested persons to appear themselves or through or with counsel 
20 This fact seems to have been obscured by undue emphasis on the Supreme Court's 
far-ranging discussion of the separate constitutional issue. In connection with that furthex 
question, the Supreme Court said that the Greene decision "lends little support to the 
respondents' position. The governmental action there reviewed was certainly of a judicial 
nature. The various Security Clearance Boards involved in Greene were not conducting 
an investigation; they were determining whether Greene could have a security clearance 
-a license in a real sense, and one that had a significant impact upon his employment. 
By contrast, the Civil Rights Commission does not make any binding orders or issue 
'clearances' or licenses having legal effect." Id. at 452. Of course, this statement was not 
made in connection with the critical question of authorization. 
so Newman, supra note 6, at 178. 
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before any agency in connection with any function, matter, or 
process whether formal, informal, public or private."31 
In spite of this clear statutory mandate, the applicable rules of 
many administrative agencies as recently as 1963 precluded counsel 
from any function except accompanying and advising the witness. 
Section 1.40 of the Rules of Practice of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, for example, until 1963 prohibited counsel from participating 
in any other fashion in non-public hearings.32 An earlier Federal 
Trade Commission rule limited counsel's function to accompany-
ing and advising the witness in all investigative hearings, both 
public and non-public.32a Although litigation initiated by the 
Kroger Company in May of 196233 led the FTC to amend its rules 
to provide for representation in public hearings, the Commission 
continued to deny this right in non-public hearings. In part, this 
agency position appears to have been based upon the pre-Adminis-
trative Procedure Act decision of Bowles v. Baer,84 which suggested 
that there is no constitutional requirement of representation in in-
vestigative hearings. The agency position also appears to have been 
based upon dicta in Hannah v. Larche, where the Supreme Court 
suggested that there was no constitutional objection to Federal 
Trade Commission Rule 1.40.35 
This position, of course, failed to take account of the simple 
fact that, in some instances, the Administrative Procedure Act 
31 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 263 (1946). 
82 Section 1.40 stated in part: "Any person compelled to testify or to produce docu-
mentary evidence in a non-public hearing may be accompanied and advised by counsel, 
but counsel may not, as a matter of right, otherwise participate in the investigational 
hearing. Any person compelled to testify or to produce documentary evidence in a public 
investigational hearing may be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel: Pro-
vided, however, That such representation shall not include the right to call, examine or 
cross-examine witnesses, or adduce evidence." 16 C.F.R. § 1.40 (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
32a 16 C.F.R. § 1.40 (Cum. Supp. 1958). 
33 Hall v. Lemke, 1962 Trade Cas. 76348 (N.D. Ill.). In the Hall case Judge Herbert 
L. Will entered a temporary restraining order halting hearings wherein plaintiffs were 
to be deprived of the right of representation. The plaintiffs claimed that the Commission 
had no statutory authority to conduct any public hearings and particularly that they had 
no authority to conduct such hearings without representation. 
H 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944). 
35 The Court referred to the Commission's 1958 rule and said that it "had found no 
authorities suggesting that the rules governing Federal Trade Commission investigations 
violate the Constitution .•.. " Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 446 (1960). See also Anon-
ymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). In both cases the 
Court approved the constitutionality of certain state proceedings (not subject to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act) which did not provide for counsel. In each case four Justices 
dissented from this holding. However, the only judicial proceedings involving § 6(a) 
recognized that its provisions applied to investigations. See Backer v. Commissioner, 275 
F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293 (D. Conn. 1949); cf. 
Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1952), involving an attempt by counsel to 
obstruct proceedings. 
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contains more stringent guarantees than do constitutional provi-
sions, and that legal representation encompasses many functions 
besides advising and accompanying the person interrogated. This 
fact was underscored by the District Court for the District of 
Columbia when FTC Rule 1.40 was directly challenged by six 
witnesses subpoenaed to appear at a non-public hearing in Septem-
ber 1962. In Wanderer v. Kaplan District Judge McLaughlin 
granted injunctive relief to these six plaintiffs and held that section 
6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act applied to investigative 
as well as adjudicative hearings.36 Distinguishing Hannah v. Larche 
on the ground that it did not deal with section 6(a), he held that 
the plaintiffs were entitled to the following: (a) the right to be 
accompanied by counsel, (b) the right to have counsel object to any 
question he deems improper, (c) the right to have counsel present 
on the record concise grounds for such objections, and (d) the 
right to have counsel, without interference from the Commission, 
its counsel, or the hearing examiner, initiate advice to the respon-
dents with respect to the propriety or illegality of any question 
and advise respondents not to answer. In reaching this conclusion, 
Judge McLaughlin relied on unpublished conclusions of law in 
FCC v. Schreiber, where Judge Yankwich had ruled that these 
rights were guaranteed by section 6(a).87 
On January 3, 1963, with two commissioners dissenting, the 
FTC denied a motion by Mead Corporation (of Dayton, Ohio) for 
full representation of a company official subpoenaed to testify in a 
non-public investigatory hearing, but announced a relaxation on 
·the restrictions that it would place on attorneys accompanying wit-
nesses. The Commission stated that the respondent's official might 
be protected as follows: (a) The official could have counsel present 
with him. (b) The official could have counsel advise him, in con-
fidence, upon either his own initiative or that of his counsel; and 
if the official refused to answer, his counsel might state on the 
record the legal grounds for refusal. (c) Respondent's counsel 
could object on the record and state the precise grounds therefor 
where claiming that the testimony is outside the scope of the in-
vestigation or that the witness is privileged (for reasons other than 
self-incrimination) to refuse to answer a question or produce other 
evidence. (d) Counsel could not otherwise interrupt the examina-
don by making any objections or statements on the record. 
86 1962 Trade Cas. 77159 (D.D.C.). 
87 Unpublished Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, FCC v. Schreiber, Civil 
No. 1258-61-Y, S.D. Cal., March I, 1962. 
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Motions challenging the Commission's authority or the sufficiency 
of the subpoena would have to be submitted in advance 'of the 
hearing. (e) Following completion of the examination, counsel 
could request the officer conducting the hearing to permit, at his 
discretion, the witness to clarify, on the record, any answers which 
might be equivocal or incomplete. 88 
The Commission also ordered that the officer conducting the 
investigation should take all necessary action to avoid undue delay, 
to restrain disorderly, dilatory, obstructionist or contumacious con-
duct of counsel and report same to the Commission. In the event 
of such conduct, counsel might thereafter be excluded from fur-
ther participation in the investigation. These Mead rules have 
now been incorporated as a part of section 1.40 of the Federal 
Trade Commission's Rules of Practice, promulgated on August 
1, 1963.39 
However, examination of the Mead rules discloses significant 
differences between the Commission's rules and the Wanderer 
rules of Judge McLaughlin. Indeed, the Commission opinion in 
Mead termed the decisions in Wanderer and Schreiber "inconclu-
sive."40 While the Wanderer and Schreiber rules allow counsel to 
object to any improper questions and "present on the record con-
cise grounds for any such objection," the Commission continues 
to allow counsel to object only on the two grounds of relevancy 
and technical privilege. Except in these cases, counsel is relegated 
to silence. Thus, the right of representation guaranteed in Wan-
derer and Schreiber, and the representation that the FTC itself 
allows in public hearings, is still denied in non-public hearings. 
The Mead Company has now challenged these new rules,41 and 
the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (Vv estern Di-
vision) has entered a temporary stay preventing the Commission 
from holding the scheduled non-public hearings. 
In June of 1963 the Commission filed a motion in the Wan-
derer case in the United States district court asking that an appeal 
from its decision in that case be dismissed and that the district 
court's restraining order be dissolved. The stated ground of the 
motion was mootness. Among other things, the district court was 
38 FTC File No. 5710656 Opinion of the Commission at 7-8 Gan. 3, 1963). 
89 FTC Rules of Practice and Procedure, August 1, 1963. 
40 FTC File No. 5710656, Opinion of the Commission 2 n.l Gan. 3, 1963). 
41 Mead v. Mulville, Civil No. 2850, S.D. Ohio, Complaint filed and stay granted Feb. 
21, 1963. 
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faced with the question of whether the Mead rules complied with 
its own decision in the Wanderer case. On July 1, 1963, Judge 
McLaughlin denied the Government motions.42 
Casting further light on the remaining question of the scope 
of representation by counsel to be accorded in non-public hear-
ings, the Administrative Conference of the United States con-
cluded that section 6(a) guarantees "as a minimum that counsel 
for any person compelled to appear in person shall be permitted 
to make objections on the record and to argue briefly the basis for 
such objections in connection with any examination of his 
client."43 The Administrative Conference did not deal with the 
outer limits of the scope of representation. 
Similarly, a special task force of the Antitrust Section of the 
American Bar Association reported on December 11, 1962: 
"The express language of the statute offers no sanction for 
the view that the mandatory grant of representation may be 
diluted by reference to policy considerations. At a minimum, 
the statutory grant allows counsel to speak on the record, ob-
ject to improper questions, argue the grounds for such ob-
jections, make motions directed to the protection of the wit-
ness, and examine his own client. The performance of these 
functions is not subject to curtailment on administrative 
whim."44 
The effect of these recommendations remains to be seen. 
The Right To Adduce Evidence 
Section 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act, dealing with 
the right to adduce evidence, is limited to adjudicative matters. 
However, in public investigational hearings, the Federal Trade 
Commission has recognized that witnesses have the right to re-
appear and testify under oath to clarify statements of third-party 
witnesses.45 In non-public hearings, the rules announced in the 
Mead decision merely provide that counsel might request the 
42 Civil No. 2819·62, and including 2824-62, D.D.C., Order dated July 1, 1963. 
43 Report of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Administrative Conference, June 29, 
1962. The Administrative Conference is an organization appointed by the President of 
the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10934, April 13, 1961, for the purpose of 
assisting " ..• the President, the Congress and the Administrative Agencies and Execu-
tive Departments in improving existing administrative procedures." 
44 FTC Investigational Hearings: Role of Vvitnesses' Counsel, Dec. 11, 1962, at 10. 
45 Commission Rule 1.40 does not expressly state this right. However, the Commission 
conceded that this right was available in connection with its defense of its public hear-
ing procedures in Hall v. Lemke, 1962 Trade Cas. 76348 (N.D. Ill.). The concession is 
set forth at p. 32 of the Commission's memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss. 
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officer conducting the hearing to permit the witness to "clarify on 
the record, any answer which might be equivocal or incomplete."46 
Arguably, the right to counsel guaranteed by section 6(a) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act may include the right of a sub-
poenaed witness to be questioned by his own counsel and to 
provide additional evidence in this fashion.47 Whether the Com-
mission intends to allow the witness to be questioned by his own 
counsel is not clear. 
A crucial question is whether Congress intended that the ex-
amination of witnesses customarily found in judicial proceedings 
should be permitted in investigational hearings. Referring to sec-
tion 6(a), the drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee stated: "The first sentence is a recog-
nition that, in the administrative process, the benefit of counsel 
shall be accorded as of right just as recognized by the Bill of Rights 
in connection with the judicial process . . . ."48 
Significantly, the sponsors of the bill in the House of Repre-
sentatives also recognized that the right to be represented by 
counsel was the right of representation granted in judicial pro-
ceedings. Thus, Congressman Walter said in the House debates on 
the proposed bill on May 24, 1946, "The representation of counsel 
contemplated by the bill means full representation as the term is 
understood in the courts of law."49 
The specific legislative intent was underscored in Backer v. 
Commissioner.r.o In dealing with the meaning of the word "repre-
sented" in its application to non-public investigations, the court 
flatly said, "When Congress used the terms 'right to be accompa-
nied, represented, and advised by counsel' it must have used the 
language in the regularly accepted connotation, even though the 
language of the courts in using it was in connection with the right 
to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion."51 
Under such circumstances, it appears that counsel for sub-
poenaed witnesses should be allowed to question their own clients. 
46 FTC File No. 5710656, Opinion of the Commission 8 (Jan. 3, 1963). 
47 Under § 6(a), it would appear that this right should be available in both public 
and private hearings if it is available at all. The section does not draw any distinction 
between the types of rights available to subpoenaed witnesses. Indeed, the House Judi-
ciary Committee Report expressly states that the right of counsel applies in connection 
with "any function, matter, or process, whether formal, informal, public or private." 
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 263 (1946). 
48 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1946). (Emphasis added.) 
49 Id. at 362-63. 
110 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960). 
Ill Id. at 144. 
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The plaintiffs in the Mead case are presently requesting this right 
in their suit in Dayton, Ohio.52 The decision of the district court 
there will certainly prove of interest to the practicing bar. 
The Right to an Impartial Hearing Examiner 
One of the most frequent complaints of persons compelled to 
testify in agency investigations involves the absence of any right 
to an impartial presiding hearing officer. 
In investigatory hearings, it has often been agency practice to 
appoint the employee in charge of prosecuting an investigation to 
preside. In fact, in a recent non-public hearing held by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, one Commission employee acted as the 
hearing officer on the first day of the hearings, while a second 
employee served as investigator and interrogated the witness. The 
next day, with the same witness on the stand, the two employees 
changed places; the hearing officer became the interrogator and the 
previous interrogator was designated as the hearing officer.68 
Sections 5 and 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act guaran-
tee that, in adjudicative proceedings, an impartial hearing ex-
aminer shall preside at the taking of evidence and that he shall 
not be engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions.54 How-
ever, in FTC v. Scientific Living, Inc.,55 FTC v. Waltham Watch 
Co.,56 and FTC v. Hallmark, Inc.,51 district courts have rejected 
the contention that these provisions apply to investigatory hear-
ings. The composite effect of these three decisions has been to dis-
courage further consideration of whether an impartial hearing 
52 Mead Corp. v. Mulville, Civil No. 2850, S.D. Ohio, Feb. 21, 1963, 
53 In the Matter of Warehouse Distributors, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 6837. While the 
transcripts of record were confidential in that case, these facts were set forth in respond-
ent's briefs to the Commission. This practice is sanctioned by the Federal Trade Com-
mission's Rules of Practice, which provide: "Inquiries and investigations are conducted, 
under the various statutes administered by the Commission, by Commission representatives 
designated and duly authorized for the purpose. Such representatives [are examiners 
within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act and] are authorized to exercise 
and perform the duties of their office in accordance with the laws of the United States 
and the regnlations of the Commission, including the administration of oaths and affirma-
tions, in any matter under investigation by the Commission." 16 C.F.R. § 1.32 (1960). 
54 Section 7 provides that "the functions of all presiding officers and of officers par-
ticipating in decisions in conformity with § 1007 of this title shall be conducted in an 
impartial manner.'' 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958). Section 5 provides: "No 
officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting 
functions for any agency in any case shall, in that or a factually related case, participate 
or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to § 1007 
of this title except as a witness or counsel in public proceedings.'' 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 
5 u.s.c. § 1004 (1958). 
55 1957 Trade Cas. 72732 (D. Pa.). 
56 1959 Trade Cas. 74904 (S.D.N.Y.). 
67 1959 Trade Cas. 75199 (7th Cir.). 
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examiner should preside over investigational hearings. While the 
three decisions seem to be correct under sections 5 and 7 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which are undeniably limited to 
adjudicative proceedings, they do not take into consideration the 
possible effects of section 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
which provides: "Except as otherwise required by law, all require-
ments or privileges relating to evidence or procedure shall apply 
equally to agencies and persons." 
This provision seeks on its face to provide equal privileges to 
both the government and private citizens. Unlike sections 5 and 
7 of the act, section 12 applies to all agency functions, whether 
adjudicative, investigative, or rule-making. To date, no subpoe-
naed witness has seen fit to raise the question of whether section 12 
prohibits an agency from reserving to itself the procedural privi-
lege of an examiner partial to its own investigating employees 
while denying this privilege to the person compelled to appear. 
This double standard was apparently recognized i11 FCC v. 
Schreiber,r.s where Judge Yankwich stated: 
"If respondents decline to answer any questions upon ad-
vice of counsel or otherwise, the propriety of all such ques-
tions shall be ruled upon by this Court upon appropriate 
motion by any of the parties hereto, and respondents shall 
not be deemed to be in contempt either of this Court or of 
the Commission or suffer or incur any penalty until and un-
less the Court has ruled in favor of the propriety of any such 
questions and respondents thereafter refuse or decline to 
answer the same."r.9 
In his oral comments during argument, Judge Yankwich com-
mented that investigators who are appointed to act as examiners 
are "all too powerful."60 In this connection he said, "I do not 
know where the examiners claim those rights. After all, examiners 
are persons of limited authority."61 
Hence, recourse to the courts for determination of the pro-
priety of the examiners' rulings on a case-by-case basis, as in 
Schreiber, may provide some protection for the rights of the citi-
zen. A better course would be for agencies to designate Administra-
tive Procedure Act hearing examiners to preside over investiga-
tional hearings. Certainly, their qualifications as impartial hearing 
r,s Civil No. 1258-61-Y, S.D. Cal., March 1, 1962. 
r,11 Id. 'ii !I of order. 
60 Id. Transcript of Argument 6, March l, 1962. 
61 Ibid. 
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officers would generate the confidence and respect of persons 
compelled to appear. 
The Right of Expeditious Completion of the Investigation 
Another complaint frequently heard from investigated persons 
is that investigations are unduly protracted. In the past, federal 
agencies have generally taken the position that investigations may 
be completed at their discretion and without regard to the incon-
venience a lengthy investigation may cause the person investigated. 
However, section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act pro-
vides: "Every agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to 
conclude any matter presented to it except that due regard shall 
be had for the convenience and necessities of the parties or their 
representatives." 
There seems to be little doubt that this provision of section 
6(a) applies to investigative hearings, just as the right of counsel 
provisions in section 6(a) apply to investigative hearings. The 
drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act dealt with all parts 
of section 6 when they expressly stated, "Section 6 deals with the 
investigative powers and other incidental matters of importance."62 
At least one government agency, however, takes the position 
that the prohibition against undue delay in section 6 does not 
apply to investigative matters. In J. Weingarten, Inc. v. FTC68 the 
Commission denied the charge that it had unduly delayed comple-
tion of an adjudicative proceeding, on the ground that the plain-
tiff's claim of undue delay was based in part upon reference to 
three investigations which had been conducted during a five-year 
period prior to the issuance of complaint proceedings. The district 
court expressly noted the lengthy Commission investigation in re-
jecting the Commission argument and concluding that the latter 
had violated section 6(a).64 
The Right to Nqtice 
No express provision of the Administrative Procedure Act 
deals with the right of a person compelled to appear in investiga-
tive hearings to notice of the matters about which he is to be ex-
s2 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 353-54 (1946). 
63 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1963 Trade Cas.) ,r 70790 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 1963). The Com-
mission's appeal is now pending in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
64 The court said: "It is true eleven months is not a lengthy time for the matter to 
remain before the Commission, but taken in connection with an investigation of five 
years, and a hearing before the Hearing Examiner of two years or better, it appears 
that the question of reasonable dispatch is completely ignored by the Commission." Id. 
at 78184. 
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amined. However, it seems clear that general principles dealing 
with the enforceability of subpoenas require that a federal agency 
give the witness a reasonably definitive statement of the subject 
matter of the inquiry. In United States v. Morton Salt Co.65 the 
Supreme Court noted that Federal Trade Commission investiga-
tive demands must not be "too indefinite." 
The Administrative Procedure Act makes it clear that a sub-
poenaed witness has a right to notice of the procedural rules which 
may be applied in investigative hearings wherein he is subpoenaed 
to testify. Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act requires 
that every agency separately state and currently publish in the 
Federal Register "statements of the general course and method by 
which its functions are channeled and determined, including the 
nature and requirements of all formal or informal procedures 
available .... " This provision appears to require promulgation 
and publication of rules without regard to the nature of the pro-
ceeding. 00 Manifestly, it should apply to investigatory hearings as 
well as to adjudicatory hearings. 
A related problem of notice arises when a person being investi-
gated is subpoenaed to testify without being adequately informed 
as to whether the hearings are actually investigatory or adjudica-
tory. This issue was raised by respondents in a recent Federal 
Trade Commission proceeding involving the Nash-Finch Com-
pany.67 Respondents, who were subject to an FTC cease-and-
desist order, were served with a Commission order purportedly 
authorizing an "investigational hearing" to determine the extent 
of violations of the order. The order further directed the Chief 
Hearing Examiner to appoint and designate a hearing examiner 
with all of the powers and duties of an adjudicative examiner ex-
cept filing an initial decision. It further directed that the hearings 
be conducted in accordance with "the Commission's Rules of 
Practice for adjudicative proceedings insofar as such rules are ap-
plicable." 
05 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). 
66 Decision of Judge Yankwich in FCC v. Schreiber, 201 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Cal. 1962), 
would appear to indicate that § 3 does not apply to purely investigative (fact finding) 
hearings where a respondent is not prejudiced. Judge Yankwich commented, "It is 
doubtful if the provisions of that Act [APA] apply to any but adjudicating agencies." 
Id. at 425. Nevertheless, the Schreiber conclusion seems at variance with the ruling of the 
Supreme Com:t in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 635 (1950), where the Court 
indicated that § 3(a) applied to all investigations, although ruling that it had not been 
violated in that particular case. 
67 In the Matter of C. H. Robinson Co., a corporation, and Nash-Finch Co., a cor-
poration, FTC Dkt. No. 4589 (Opinion, Nov. 4, 1963). 
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Thus, the order did not specify whether an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding or a purely investigatory proceeding was to be conducted. 
Although the order provided that adjudicatory rules would govern 
"where applicable," it did not define the areas in which such rules 
were applicable. The respondents have now filed a motion re-
questing clarification of the order and promulgation of rules pur-
suant to section 3(a). No Commission ruling has been made on this 
motion. 
The Right to Judicial Protection of Investigatory Rights 
In past years, some federal agencies have taken the rather cyni-
cal position that, even if a person compelled to appear has some 
rights, the courts have no jurisdiction to protect these rights. This 
proposition finds its main thrust in the argument that plaintiffs 
cannot demonstrate irreparable injury sufficient to warrant equi-
table relief. While certain commentary of the Supreme Court in 
its 1927 decision in FTC v. Claire Furnace Co.68 supports this ar-
gument, its validity seems to have been largely dispelled by the 
subsequent enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934,69 
section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946,70 and the 
new Act of October 5, 1962,71 which provides that "The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature 
of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States 
or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 
Indeed, it seems clear that the Declaratory Judgment Act should 
allow a person compelled to submit to interrogation to seek judi-
cial relief prior to submitting to challenged procedures in investi-
gative hearings, particularly where the agency's organic statute 
provides for criminal penalties against witnesses who refuse to 
testify pursuant to subpoena. To hold otherwise would mean that 
a subpoenaed witness might be forced to choose between submit-
ting to challenged procedures and defying the subpoena at the 
risk of litigating the propriety of such defiance in a public criminal 
proceeding. · 
In Evers v. Dwyer72 the Supreme Court ruled that the district 
courts have jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act to 
determine cases where plaintiffs, threatened with improper ad-
os 274 U.S. 160 (1927). 
69 28 u.s.c. § 400 (1958). 
70 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958). 
71 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1361(e) (1958). 
72 358 U.S. 202 (1958). 
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ministrative action, might be forced to forfeit their rights under 
fear of criminal penalties. In St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States73 
the Supreme Court made it clear that plaintiffs challenging agency 
investigative action need not await an attempt to collect monetary 
penaltiei. 
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has ruled in Deering Milliken, 
Inc. v. ]ohnston74 that district courts have jurisdiction under sec-
tion IO of the Administrative Procedure Act when specific rights 
guaranteed by the Administrative Procedure Act might be abro-
gated in the absence of court action. The court noted that a pur-
pose of the act was "to give a party injured by a violation of one 
of the terms of the bill, the right of enforcement by the extra-
ordinary remedies of injunction, prohibition, and quo warranto."71> 
The record of court proceedings in the past two years demon-
strates that the courts have not been hesitant in exercising their 
jurisdiction to halt threatened violations of rights of citizens in 
investigatory hearings. Both the Hall and Wanderer cases are good 
examples of the exercise of this jurisdiction. In Wanderer, the 
district court summarily rejected the contention that a subpoenaed 
witness would not be irreparably injured if he was deprived of his 
statutory right to counsel.76 Thus, the authorities confirm that the 
district courts are available to persons aggrieved by agency viola-
tions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Conclusion 
It is now a matter of history that, in three decades, the com-
pulsory investigational processes of a host of administrative agen-
cies have largely displaced the grand jury as the method of in-
quisition most frequently utilized in the enforcement of federal 
legislation. Paradoxically, the impact of these procedures, at least 
in quantitative terms, falls principally upon the business com-
munity rather than upon those persons and minority groups whose 
rights are most often championed by vigilant advocates of civil 
liberties. 
That private rights have been violated by the procedures of 
some agencies cannot be disputed. Recent court decisions plainly 
suggest that a basic reappraisal of the investigational procedures 
of these agencies is desirable. 
73 368 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1961). 
74. 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). 
71S Id. at 863. 
76 Accordingly, it granted both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. 
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The tone for such a re-examination is found in the executive 
order of President Kennedy establishing the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States.77 That order recognizes that maxi-
mum government efficiency and fairness to private interests are 
coequal objectives. Neither is subordinate to the other. . 
On the basis of existing law, agency procedures governing in-
vestigational hearings should, at a minimum, give effect to the 
following principles: 
First: Where Congress has not explicitly authorized a denial 
of confrontation and cross-examination in statutes authorizing in-
vestigational hearings, these rights presumptively are present and 
should be accorded the letter and spirit of the Greene and Hannah 
decisions. 
Second: The right to be represented by counsel, as provided 
by section 6 of the Administrative Procedure Act, should be fully 
provided as intended by Congress. No party compelled to appear 
and give testimony should be forced to obtain a court order to 
assure this basic right. 
Third: The objective of section 12 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act that the agency and the private party should have 
equal standing on matters of "evidence or procedure" should be 
implemented by designating impartial Administrative Procedure 
Act hearing officers to preside over investigational hearings. 
Fourth: Any person who is compelled to appear and give 
testimony or to produce documents should be given notice in 
specific form of the nature and scope of the investigation. 
The granting of these procedural rights need not hinder or 
prevent the orderly conduct of government business. The true 
challenge to the agencies and the bar lies in formulating proce-
dures which protect the rights of the individual and at the same 
time assure the expeditious handling of government business. 
Decisions of the courts confirm that the point has been reached 
where no further time should be spent justifying the denial of 
rights in the name of efficiency. 
77 Executive Order 10934, April 13, 1961. 
